Paul Goble
Staunton,
Apr. 20 – Russian and international media have devoted enormous attention to
Moscow’s decision to withdraw its so-called “peace keepers” from Azerbaijan and
to close the monitoring center it had operated with Turkey since 2020 even
though it had a mandate to keep them there until 2025.
But in a
certain sense, this decision became almost inevitable after Baku established
complete control over Qarabagh and the Armenian separatist regime there
disbanded. After all, if there were no parties to keep separate and defend, there
was little reason that these forces should remain despite the hopes, expectations
and fears of some that Moscow would not pull them.
Moreover,
Moscow desperately needs additional manpower for its expanded invasion of Ukraine;
and the 2500 plus Russian soldiers now being pulled out of Azerbaijani
territory either directly or indirectly will be able to make a significant
addition to the Russian army now fighting in Ukraine.
Consequently,
while some writers have been alarmist about what Moscow has done in Azerbaijan,
asking if Russia is “leaving the South Caucasus” and thus leaving it to other
powers (vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/rossia-pokidaet-kavkaz.html
and rosbalt.ru/news/2024-04-19/stanislav-pritchin-chto-oznachaet-dosrochnyy-vyvod-rossiyskih-mirotvortsev-iz-karabaha-5060250), such fears seem overblown.
On the one hand, Baku has long pursued
a balanced foreign policy, one that seeks good relations with both Moscow and
the West. The departure of Russian troops from Azerbaijan doesn’t change that.
And on the other, Baku and Moscow negotiated this departure in advance of 2025
rather than their exit being the result of Baku’s unilateral demands.
The situation with regard to Russian
forces inside Armenia is different. There is a Russian military base there at
Gyumri and Russia has been providing border guards for Armenia along its
borders with Turkey and Iran since 1993 and with Azerbaijan since the front
between Armenia and Azerbaijan stabilized in the mid-1990s.
Now, with Moscow agreeing to
withdraw its “peace keepers” from Azerbaijan because the situation has changed,
Yerevan has called on Moscow to follow the same logic and pull its border
guards from Tavush Oblast along the Azerbaijani border (ekhokavkaza.com/a/pashinyan-rossiyskie-pogranichniki-pokinut-tavushskuyu-oblastj-armenii/32913701.html).
But Yerevan’s
action is not simply an effort to be treated in an equal fashion. In March, for
example, Yerevan directly called on Moscow to pull its border guards from the
Armenia capital’s airport; and many Armenians have expressed the hope that
Russia will ultimately close its Gyumri base.
And Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been reorienting Armenia’s foreign policy away
from Moscow and toward the West and especially France, breaking with Yerevan’s
longstanding one of being closely allied with Russia in order to defend itself
against what it fears are threats from Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Now, some
commentators are worried that his efforts to get Russian troops to leave are paving
the way for Armenia’s rapprochement with and even membership in NATO, something
Moscow completely opposes and will certainly resist (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2024-04-20--mirotvorcy-uhodjat-iz-karabaha-a-pashinjan-idet-v-nato-72836).
If Armenia succeeds in getting
Russian troops to leave, that will create a new geopolitical situation in the
South Caucasus; if Moscow works to prevent this as it can be counted on to do, that
raises the possibility of more conflict within Armenia and possibly between
Armenia and its neighbors.